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Resumo
Neste artigo discutimos o papel do conteúdo descritivo nos usos dêiticos dos 
demonstrativos. Nosso foco está em casos em que as descrições demonstrativas 
são licenciadas por conteúdo descritivo adicional, tornando dispensáveis elementos 
indexicais como as demonstrações e a saliência contextual. Com base em tais casos, 
argumentamos que: (i) o componente indexical das descrições demonstrativas 
deve fazer referência a subsituações da situação de fala, como proposto por Wolter 
(2006); (ii) a dêixis demonstrativa, porque se refere a essas subsituações, pode ser 
imprecisa; nesses casos, é necessário computar composicionalmente o conteúdo 
descritivo das descrições demonstrativas. Isso constitui um argumento contra a 
ideia de que o componente indexical dos demonstrativos se refere diretamente 
ao referente da descrição demonstrativa, como na chamada “teoria da referência 
direta” de Kaplan (1989), e como em outras abordagens (NUNBERG 1993, 
2004; KING, 2001; ELBOURNE, 2008, entre outros).
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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss the role of descriptive content in deictic uses of 
demonstratives. Our focus is on cases where descriptive descriptions are 
licensed for additional descriptive content, making indexical elements such as 
demonstrations and contextual salience unnecessary. On the basis of these cases, 
we argue that: (i) the indexical component of the descriptive descriptions must 
refer to subsituations of the speech situation, as proposed by Wolter (2006); 
(ii) because it refers to these subsituations, the demonstrative deixis may be 
imprecise; in such cases, it is necessary to compute the descriptive content of the 
demonstrative descriptions compositionally. This is an argument against the idea 
that the indexical component of the demonstratives directly refers to the referent 
of the demonstrative description, as in the so-called “direct reference theory” 
proposed by Kaplan (1989), as well as in others approaches (NUNBERG, 1993, 
2004; KING, 2001; ELBOURNE, 2008, among others).
Keywords: demonstratives, deixis, situation semantics, direct reference.
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Introduction
The basic facts we want to discuss in this paper are the following: deictic uses of demonstrative descriptions (DEMs) usually require a demonstration to be felicitous, as shown by the contrast between (1a) 
and (1b) below; but, under some circumstances, additional descriptive content 
makes the demonstration unnecessary, as shown by the contrast between (1b) 
and (1c):
(1)  Context: in a restaurant, the manager and a waiter on the bar are 
  facing the customers in the room. The manager whispers to the 
  waiter:
 a. [pointing to couple 2:] 
  That couple wants a cesar sallad.
 b. [with no pointing:] 
  # That couple wants a cesar sallad.
 c. [with no pointing:] 
  That couple next to the window wants a cesar sallad.
couple 1
couple 3 couple 2
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 Clarifying our terminology: under standard assumptions (e.g., HEIM; 
KRATZER, 1998), DEMs are DPs minimally constituted by a demonstrative 
determiner (that, this) and a constituent headed by the noun, e.g., that couple in 
(1a). The nominal constituent is responsible for the “descriptive content” of the 
DEM; we will say that it carries additional descriptive content when the noun 
head is further modified, say, by an adjective, a PP, a relative clause, etc. – as in 
(1c).
 As we intend to show, a proper understanding of the contrasts in (1) can 
shed some light on a basic issue concerning the semantics and the pragmatics 
of DEMs, namely: what is the role of the descriptive content of a DEM in the 
identification of its referent? We will approach the issue under a more technical 
formulation: how does the contextual indexing of a DEM interact with its 
descriptive content? 
 We take contextual indexing to be the component in the interpretation of 
deictic elements responsible for encoding deixis – that is, the relation between 
the expression and elements of the speech situation (the “indices”) necessary 
for an adequate interpretation of that expression. Here, we consider two views 
of the contextual indexing of demonstratives. The first one claims that indices 
of demonstratives semantically correspond to individuals picked up by the 
demonstrations in the relevant speech situation, a view shared by a number of 
authors, including Kaplan (1989), King (2001), Nunberg (1993, 2004), Elbourne 
(2008), among others. The second view we will consider – actually, the one we 
adopt and discuss in more depth here – was proposed by Wolter (2006): for her, 
the indices of demonstratives are subsituations of the general speech situation. We 
will argue that deictic uses of DEMs licensed by additional descriptive content – 
that is, cases like (1c) above – strongly support Wolter’s theory.
 Wolter herself does not discuss the role of additional descriptive content 
in deictic uses of demonstratives in detail. But she does discuss another use 
of DEMs in which additional descriptive content has a similar licensing role, 
namely what she calls “descriptive uses” (see section 2 below). In her analysis, 
she resorts to an idea that Dayal (1998) proposed to account for subtrigged 
any, namely, additional descriptive content introduces a “modally independent 
situation”. Though this seems well motivated for cases discussed by Wolter, we 
show here that the idea cannot be extended to all cases of deictic uses of DEMs. 
Still, we argue that even the cases not covered in this way can be accounted 
for naturally under Wolter’s approach with one simple additional hypothesis – 
deixis can be “imprecise”. 
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we provide the theoretical 
background for the discussion, focusing on theories of demonstrative indexing; 
in section 3 we discuss the way Wolter accounts for the licensing role of 
additional descriptive content in the use of DEMs; this gives us occasion to 
present our main addition to Wolter’s analysis – the hypothesis that situation 
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indexing may be “imprecise”, that is, indeterminate; this plays an important role 
in our analysis, explaining both “attributive-like” uses of DEMs and, crucially, 
deictic uses licensed by additional descriptive content; in section 4 we turn back 
to such cases and we show how Wolter’s approach, under our interpretation, 
is capable of dealing with them – even in cases where additional descriptive 
content does not introduce a “modally independent situation”; we think some 
of these cases indicate the deictic component of demonstratives must refer to 
situations rather than to individuals; section 5 is a brief recap.
1. The theoretical issue
Though varying widely in implementation, many current theories 
of demonstratives encode the idea that contextual indexing should have some 
component that corresponds to the individual pointed at in the speech situation. 
This is the issue we want to contribute to here: whether demonstrative indexing 
necessarily corresponds to individuals, or to some other logical element – in 
particular, situations. Theories of demonstrative indexing based on individual-
valued  indices include not only Kaplan’s (1989) theory of “direct reference”, but 
also many other recent proposals.1 Consider an utterance like (2) below from the 
perspective of some such theories (see Teixeira and Menuzzi (2015a), Teixeira 
(2017), for further references):
(2)  That woman [pointing] was my colleague at high school.
 Under the analysis proposed by King (2001), demonstrative determiners 
have the semantics in (3a) below, in which “b” is the demonstrative index: the 
variable whose value is assigned by the context and corresponds to “object of the 
perceptual intention”, that is, the object picked up by the speaker’s demonstration 
(cf. KING, 2001, p.43 and ff.).2 Given the semantics in (3a), the utterance in (2) 
above would be interpreted as in (3b):
1   In Kaplan’s early paper, demonstrations are “[…] typically, though not invariably, a (visual) 
presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing” (1989a, p. 753). Wolter (2006, p. 
177), in turn, says that “demonstrations establish non-default situations”. So, when restricted 
enough, situations may be pragmatically “equivalent” to individuals in that they happen to 
determine a piece of the world roughly circumscribed by an individual. Still, such situations 
are not logically “equivalent” to individuals, if the semantics adopted distinguishes the two sets 
of primitive entities. As we said and as will become clear, in this paper we argue for Wolter’s 
approach. For further discussion on demonstrations, see Teixeira and Menuzzi (2015a). 
2  Being the object picked up by the demonstration, it is b that will be further constrained 
by the “spatial constraint” on the demonstrative deixis – that is, b is the element that must be 
“distant from the speaker” in order to the use of that (as opposed to this) to be successful.
 
514
(3) a. [[ [S [DP that [NP F]] [VP G]] ]] = λP λQ [ P and the property of being 
  identical to b are uniquelyjointly instantiated in w and t in an 
  object x, and x has Q ]
 b. [[(2)]]  = The property of being woman and the property of being 
  identical to b are uniquely jointly instantiated in w and t in an 
  object x,and x has the property of being the speaker’s colleague at 
  high school.
Clearly, the contextual variable “b” in (3a) is the component in King’s 
analysis that implements the idea that demonstrative indices refer to individuals. 
Note that, under the above view, either the demonstrative index, or the descriptive 
content of the DEM, will be somehow redundant, as discussed by King himself: 
besides pointing to the individual – which is a unique identification –, (3b) 
additionally encodes that “the property of being a woman” must be “uniquely 
instantiated” in the context by an object. That is, only one individual must satisfy 
the condition “being a woman” in the relevant context (encoded by indices “w” 
and “t”), and this quite independently of the unique identification coded by 
the index “b”. Of course, redundancy is not a problem in itself if empirically 
justified, but still a theory that avoids redundancy is to be preferred conceptually 
(especially when empirical coverage is comparable).3  
Now, let us consider a very different analysis of demonstratives, a more 
complex one – in particular, with respect to indexing. It is Elbourne (2008)’s, 
intended to be a formal implementation of the various suggestions made by 
Nunberg (1993). 
 According to Nunberg, many elements intervene in the interpretation of 
deictic expressions. First, he argues the index – the element contextually picked 
up by deixis (for demonstratives, the element pointed at) – must be distinguished 
from the denotation of deictic expressions. For example, in the case of the 1st 
person plural pronoun we, the index is the speaker, that is, the same index of 
pronoun I, the form for 1st person singular; but of course the denotations of 
these two pronouns are different (NUNBERG, 1993, p. 8). 
 Nunberg further claims that the relation between the index and 
the denotation has two components: the relation properly speaking, and a 
“classificatory” component. In the case of the pronoun we, the relation between 
the index (the speaker) and the denotation (a group of individuals) is “inclusion”. 
Nunberg’s “classificatory” component is the set of additional restrictions the 
deictic expression may impose on its denotation: in the case of we, the denotation 
3  King argues that the referred redundancy is justified because there are less central cases in 
which the two components are not redundant. This would be the case of some “no demonstration, 
no speaker intention” uses in which demonstrative descriptions are not interchangeable with 
definite descriptions (cf. King 2001, p. 68 and ff.). We will not be able to consider such cases 
here in detail, but for some discussion on “no demonstration, no speaker intention” uses, see 
section 3 below; on the “redundancy” of descriptive content, see also fn.10 here.
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is plural, and the individuals are animate. (On Nunberg’s analysis of we, see 
Nunberg (1993), p. 8-9; also Elbourne (2008), p. 13-14).
For Nunberg, with demonstratives not only the index is given by the 
context, but also its relation with the denotation.4 This can be seen in Elbourne’s 
formalization in (4a) below, where: “x” corresponds to the index (the individual 
picked up by the demonstration); “z” corresponds to the denotation (the unique 
individual denoted by the DEM); and “R” is the relation between “x” and “z” (cf. 
ELBOURNE, 2008, p. 24). Given the semantics in (4a), the sentence in (2) gets 
the interpretation in (4b) below. 
(4) a. [[ [DP [[that x] R] PNP] ]] =  λx. λR. λP. λs. ιz [R(x, z)(s) & 
  P(z)(s) & distant-from (x, speaker)(s)]
 b.  [[(2)]]  =  λx. λs. ιz  [z = x in s 
      & z is a woman in s 
      & x is distant from speaker in s] .  
      z was a colleague of the speaker in s.
Here again we have a theory – in particular, in Elbourne’s implementation 
– in which demonstrative indexing incorporates a particular element referring 
to an individual, namely the variable “x”, which is assigned as a contextual value 
to the individual picked up by the demonstration; and this individual is identical 
to the unique individual denoted by the DEM (in the case of a referential use; 
but see fn.3 above). And again we see that either the relevant indexical element, 
“x”, or the descriptive content, is somehow redundant: again the individual 
(uniquely) pointed at must be identical to an individual that uniquely satisfy 
the DEM’s descriptive content in the context, the contextual restriction being 
encoded by index situation variable s.
 Thus, a number of current analyses of demonstratives incorporate the 
claim that demonstrative indexing must refer to an individual in some way. 
And, at the same time, they appear to incorporate some redundancy in that 
both demonstrative indexing and descriptive content have an identificational 
role: demonstrative indexing singles out a unique individual by means of 
a demonstration or some other way of expressing the speaker’s “perceptual 
4  Nunberg’s proposal is based on what he calls “descriptive uses” of demonstratives, illustrated 
in (i), in which “he” does not refer to Francisco I, but to individuals who have been Popes:
(i)  [Pointing to Francisco I:] He used to be Italian.
In (i) the index is Francisco I, the denotation is “individuals who have been Popes”, and 
the relation is “individuals who have had Francisco I’s job in the past”. For Nunberg, such 
cases indicate that the relation between the index and the denotation depends on contextual 
information. In Elbourne’s formalization, the relation is part of the compositional semantics of 
the demonstrative; hence it is present in referential uses of DEMs as well – as in (2), where the 
index and the denotation seem to coincide. Of course, this is a problem which Elbourne tries 
to solve claiming that, as a default, this “contextual relation” is identity, as in the interpretation 
in (4b). We will not be able to discuss this aspect of Elbourne (2008)’s implementation here. 
516
intention”; and uniqueness is required to hold of the DEM’s descriptive content 
in a particular context. 
 Now, a very different proposal has been put forward by Lynsey Wolter 
in her PhD dissertation (WOLTER, 2016). Her basic idea is to take advantage 
of the fact that, since Kratzer (1989), it is generally assumed that expressions can 
be interpreted relative to situations – as, indeed, assumed by Elbourne in (4a,b) 
above. Of course, situation indices already refer to the context relative to which 
an expression must be interpreted. So, Wolter’s proposal for demonstratives is 
that this indexical element allows us to dispense with the index corresponding 
to the individual pointed at in deictic uses. 
Wolter’s theory to DEMs and definite descriptions is based on situation 
semantics of Kratzer (1989) and according to it all predicates (NPs and VPs) 
have a situation argument. Technically, Wolter’s basic innovation lies in the 
distinction she introduces in the set of situations: (a) definite descriptions (and 
non-modalized predicates) are interpreted relative to the “default” speech situation 
(s0); s0 is the maximal discourse situation; (b) DEMs are interpreted relative to 
“non-default” situations (s1, s2, …), which are “subsituations” or a proper subset (sn 
⊂ s0) of the default situation. Given this distinction, Wolter proposes a semantics 
formalization like in (5a) below for demonstrative determiners; utterance (2) 
now gets an interpretation like in (5b): 
(5) a. [[ [DP [that  [NP P]] ]] =  λsn. λP. ιx [P(x)(sn) & distant-from(x, 
  speaker)(sn)]
 b.  [[(2)]] =  λsn. ιx [x is a woman in sn & x is distant from speaker in 
  sn] . 
      x was a colleague of the speaker in s0
Under this analysis, (2) can be true if the presupposition introduced by 
the demonstrative description is satisfied: if there is a particular subsituation of 
the speech situation such that there is a unique woman in that subsituation and 
she is distant from the speaker.
 Now the crucial difference between Wolter’s theory and the previous 
ones is that Wolter’s does not have any “referential index” – an index 
corresponding directly to the individual pointed at. The only index in (2b) 
is the subsituation index – and the demonstration is a way of indicating this 
subsituation. Crucially: the referent is identified by being the unique individual 
satisfying the descriptive content in that subsituation. (We note, in passim, that 
the interpretation of predicates relative to situations, or worlds, is independently 
required in most truth-conditional approaches; see Wolter (2006) and Teixeira 
(2017)  for discussion.)
 Of course, under this view there is no redundancy between the 
indexical component of a DEM and its descriptive content: indexing identifies 
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the subsituation in which the compositional meaning of the DEM must be 
computed; and the descriptive content is the compositional means, with unicity 
presupposition, to compute the denotation; both together identify an unique 
referent in a particular situation picked by the demonstration, with no redundancy. 
In this sense, Wolter’s approach is conceptually more interesting than theories 
that encode reference to an individual by indexing and, at the same time, require 
uniqueness with respect to the descriptive content.
 Beyond conceptual considerations, the question to be answered is 
empirical: is there any evidence showing that referent identification does depend 
on the interaction of the descriptive content with unicity and situation indexing? 
 Moreover, Wolter assumes “non-default situations” – that is, subsituations 
of the speech situation – must be themselves identified by “pragmatic means” 
– either a demonstration or “contextual salience” (see Wolter (2006), Teixeira 
and Menuzzi (2015a), for discussion). But this is precisely the problem with the 
examples that interest us here, namely cases like (1c) above: in (1c) the deictic use 
of a DEM is successful without any apparent means of indicating the relevant 
subsituation – be it a demonstration or contextual salience. So, a second question 
to be answered is: how can the referent be identified in (1c) if indexing does 
not indicate the subsituation unambiguously? What is the role of additional 
descriptive content in these cases?
2. Additional descriptive content and “modally independent situations”
 Let us turn to the issue of the role of additional descriptive content in cases 
like (1c). As we already mentioned, Wolter herself does not discuss such cases in 
her dissertation, but she does consider the role of additional descriptive content 
in another use of DEMs, namely, what she calls “descriptive uses”. Here we will 
call them “no demonstration, no speaker intention” (NDNS) uses, following 
King (2001), in order to avoid confusion with Nunberg (1993)’s “descriptive 
uses” (see fn. 4 above). 
Specifically, in NDNS cases DEMs are interpreted in a way similar to 
attributive definite descriptions (see King (2001), Wolter (2006), for further 
discussion), as shown in (6a) below; the absence of the relevant reading in (6b) 
shows that NDNS uses of  DEMs require some additional descriptive content, 
such as the relative clause in (6a):
(6) a. That/The student [who scored one hundred on the exam] is a genius.
  “Whoever is the student who scored one hundred on the exam, he 
  is a genius”
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 b. That student is a genius.
  “#Whoever is the student, he is a genius.”5 
 But it is not any sort of additional descriptive content that licenses 
NDNS readings: Wolter observes that such readings seem to present the same 
constraints as the so-called “subtrigged any”, discussed in Dayal (1998; see also 
Dayal (2004)). Consider any first: the contrast between (7a) and (7b) shows that 
it can be licensed – hence, “subtrigged” – by additional descriptive content; and 
the contrast between (7b) and (7c) shows that it is licensed by some modifiers like 
relative clauses and other adjuncts, but not by arguments of the head noun: 
(7) a. ?? John bought any picture.  
 b. John bought any picture [that was on sale in the gallery].
 c. ?? John bought any picture [of Queen Elizabeth].
Crucially, Wolter points out NDNS uses of DEMs show a similar 
pattern: a DEM without some additional modifier cannot be interpreted as 
NDNS expression, as in (8a) below (also in (6b) above); it does have such an 
interpretation if the modifiers is a relative clause, as in (8b) below (also in (6a)); 
but, just like subtrigged any, the NDNS reading is also excluded if the modifier 
is an argument of the head noun, as in (8c):
(8) a. [That inventor] is a genius.  (#NDNS; OKanaphora/deixis)
 b. [That inventor who created the computer] is a genius.  (OKNDNS)
 c. [That inventor of the computer] is a genius. (#NDNS; OKanaphora/ 
          deixis)
As Dayal and Wolter show, it is not only relative clauses, but a class of 
adjuncts, that licenses both subtrigged any and NDNS uses of DEMs. Thus, the 
question is: why only adjuncts? 
 In Dayal’s analysis of subtrigged any, the crucial property of adjuncts 
is that they are “modally independent”, in particular because – as she argues – 
they have temporal independence with respect to the head nouns. Technically, 
she takes them to introduce a situation which properly constrains the universal 
quantification of any, as in (9b) below; absence of such a situation results in an 
utterance like (9a), which is false:
5  The reading is possible, though, if the DEM is anaphoric to a DP with a generic-like 
reading:
(i)  The/Any student who scored one hundred on the exam must really know all about 
  integrals. That student surely is a genius. (= “Whoever is the student who scored etc., 
  he is a genius.”)
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(9) a. [[(7a)]] = ∀s,x [picture (x, s)] . $s’ [s < s’ & buy(j, x, s’)]
 b. [[(7b)]] = ∀s,x [picture (x, s) &  $s’ [s < s’ & on-sale(x, s’) & 
    past(s’)]] . 
    $s” [s < s’’ & buy(j, x, s”) & past(s”)]
According to the analysis in (9a), (7a) is interpreted as meaning something 
like: for all situation s and individual x such that x is a picture in s, there is a 
situation s’ that extends s and John bought x in s’. Given this analysis, Dayal 
(1998, p. 453) suggests the following account for the marginality of sentences 
like (7a): 
[…] there will be many situations that will render the statement 
false, for example, all those [picture] situations that do not 
overlap with John’s existence. There is something infelicitous 
in making a statement that is doomed to be false. One way to 
formalize this intuition about unacceptability of any in episodic 
sentences […] is to treat it as a case of presupposition failure. 
In using an any phrase, the speaker chooses to talk about all 
situations, but in making an assertion about a bounded time 
interval, she must focus on a restricted set of situations. This 
results in an irresolvable conflict of presuppositions. 
That is, for Dayal, by using any the speaker incurs in a conflict of 
presuppositions, which she takes to amount to a presupposition failure – hence, 
the sentence’s pragmatic infelicity.6 
Consider (9b) now. According to it, (7b) means: for all x and s, (a) if x is a 
picture in s and there is a situation s’ (in the past) in which s is contained and x is 
on sale in s’, then the truth of (7b) can be computed; and (b) (7b) is true iff there 
is another situation s’’ in the past in which s is contained and John bought x in s”. 
According to Dayal (2004, p. 223),  under this interpretation, a sentences like (7b) 
restricts the domain of quantification to those possible individuals and situations 
that also fulfill the property in the relative clause (including the property of 
being in the temporal interval denoted by the tense specification of the clause). 
Thanks to this restriction, utterance (7b) is not about all situations and pictures, 
but only about situations and pictures such that the situation is contained in some 
past situation and the picture was on sale in that past situation. 
 As for the fact that arguments do not license subtrigged any, Dayal’s 
proposal is simple: arguments are not independent predicates, let alone “modally 
independent” from the head noun. Actually, being arguments of the function 
6  A reviewer finds it implausible that the marginality of sentences like (7a) be due to pragmatic 
infelicity of the sort proposed by Dayal. He/she observes that utterances can be unlikely to be 
true, and they can even be contradictory, without being “unacceptable”. Dayal herself discusses 
similar objections, though arguing that her analysis can be maintained (see Dayal (1998), p.253, 
fn.5).
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denoted by the noun, they must belong to the same situation as that relative 
to which the predicate is interpreted. That is, formally – unlike, say, a relative 
clause – an argument is in a sense “part of” the nominal predicate and do not 
introduce an independent situation. This is what we represent in (9c) below:
(9) c. [[(7c)]] = ∀s, x [picture-of-QE (x, s)] .  $s’ [s < s’ & buy(j, x, s’)]
It is easy to see that, under the assumptions above, (7c) is unacceptable 
because the universal quantification expressed by any is improperly restricted, 
just like (7a). Hence, an utterance like (7c) is pragmatically anomalous, too. 
 Of course, being the case that NDNS uses of DEMs show the same 
restriction, there should be a way of adapting Dayal’s analysis to DEMs. Indeed, 
this can be done under Wolter’s theory of DEMs with a very simple hypothesis. 
Here is our proposal: non-default situations – the subsituations of the speech 
situation referred to by the indexical component of demonstratives – can be 
indeterminate, that is, their limits may not precisely known or indicated by the 
speaker. Let us notationally represent such indeterminate non-default situations 
by using “s?”, instead of s1, s2, etc7. This additional possibility for non-default 
situations correctly predicts the attributive-like properties of NDNS readings of 
DEMs. To see this, consider how the analyses for (8a,b,c) above would look like:8 
(10) a. [[(8a)]] = ιx [inventor (x, s?) & distant-from (x, speaker, s?)] . 
         [genius(x, s0)]
7  A reviewer notes that not only non-default situations can be indeterminate, but also 
default situations, which is of course true – an observation that is fully compatible with our 
analysis. Here is an example: suppose a professor says to another, in a party with students, the 
utterance “I hope the students are not hearing what you’re saying”. To which students is he 
referring? Pragmatically, it is likely that he is referring to students who are spatially close – and 
even so there will be indeterminacy about which students are covered by the “default” situation.
 Another reviewer questions our notation (subscripting situation variables with “?”), asking 
how it should be interpreted logically or semantically. We are not yet in the position to advance 
a more definite interpretation of the text’s notation. It might just be the boundaries between 
situations may not be totally determined. Actually, this possibility is sometimes suggested by 
Kratzer, e.g., when she says: “The parts of a world are its situations. Since worlds are parts of 
themselves, they are also situations. They are maximal situations, situations that are not part 
of other situations” (1989, p. 611). Technically, it might be that speaker and listener come to 
agree that, under certain circumstance, the discrimination among situations does not need to go 
beyond a particular limit. In such circumstances, the referred situation might be, say, s41, s42 or 
s43 – but it is not relevant to distinguish among them. 
8  Wolter (2006, 2007)’s own implementation of Dayal’s analysis here suggested 
is very likely to be incorrect: it results in an interpretation just like any simple deictic use of 
DEMs – in which the relevant subsituation is determinate. So, truth conditions are just the same 
as those of a deictic use, and do not explain the attributive-like properties of the NDNS DEMs.
 A further note on the pragmatics of NDNS DEMs: this reading usually implies that the 
referent is unknown by the speaker, which might explain why only the “distal” demonstrative 
is compatible with it. The utterance below, referring to an unknown inventor, is possible only 
if the DEM is anaphoric:
 (i)  This inventor who created the computers is a genius.   
   (#NDNS; OKanaphora/deixis)
 See also Wolter (2007) for further discussion.
L. Roehring 
Teixiera & S. de 
M. Menuzzi 
Understanding 
the interaction 
between 
demonstrative 
deixis and 
descriptive content 
521
Revista Letras, 
Curitiba, ufpr, 
n. 96, pp.509-529, 
jul./dez. 2017.
issn 2236-0999
(versão eletrônica)
 b. [[(8b)]] = ιx [inventor (x, s?) & distant-from (x, speaker, s?) &
  $s’ [s? < s’ & create-computers(x, s’) & past(s’)]]] . [genius(x, s0)]
 c. [[(8c)]] = ιx [inventor-of-computers (x, s?) & distant-from 
               (x, speaker, s?)] . [genius(x, s0)]
Clearly, (10a) indicates why a DEM, with no restriction on the 
indeterminate subsituation, cannot be felicitous: since the subsituation is 
indeterminate, there is no way of verifying which subsituation the speaker is 
talking about – hence, we can not verify the truth conditions of the sentence 
(8a). The case of (10c)/(8c) is similar: if arguments are just part of the situation 
introduced by their predicates, that is, if they do not introduce a situation on 
their own, they do not constrain the situation introduced by their predicates – 
and, again, there is no way of verifying which subsituation the speaker is talking 
about.
 But consider (10b) now. Under this analysis, (8b) means something like: 
if there is a unique x such that x is an inventor in the speech subsituation s? and 
is distant from the speaker in s? , and there is a situation s’ such that s? is part of s’ 
and x created computers in s’, then (8b) is true if and only if x is a genius in the 
default situation s0 . Now, the situation introduced by the “modally independent” 
modifier does provide the means for verifying the truth conditions of the 
sentence: the speaker did not specify which non-default situation s? he is talking 
about – hence, in a sense, it is “distant from” him; but he did specify that there 
is a situation s’ of which situation s? is part of – s’ must be a situation such that x 
is the unique individual who created a computer in it. Of course this properly 
restricts the set of situations that must be looked for. 
 The analysis just sketched explains why DEMs can have the NDNS 
reading, and actually provides a very intuitive description of the truth conditions 
of such readings. That is: under the assumption that non-default situations 
can be indeterminate, Wolter’s theory of demonstratives is able to explain the 
attributive-like use of DEMs.
 Crucially, the line of explanation just proposed for NDNS DEMs does 
seem to explain some of cases in which deictic DEMs require no pointing to be 
successful in specifying the relevant non-default situation. Let us reconsider the 
contrast between (1b) and (1c) above. Under the assumptions we have just made, 
these utterances in (1a), (1b) and (1c) would get the following interpretations (x 
is a plural individual in (11) below):
(11)  a. [[(1a)]] = ιx [couple(x, s4) & distant-from (x, speaker, s4)] . 
    [wants-a-cesar-sallad(x, s0)]
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 b. [[(1b)]] = ιx [couple(x, s?) & distant-from(x, speaker, s?)] . 
    [wants-a-cesar-sallad(x, s0)]
 c. [[(1c)]] = ιx [couple(x, s?) & distant-from(x, speaker, s?) &
    $s’ [s? < s’ & next-to-the-window(x, s0)]]] . 
    [wants-a-cesar-sallad(x, s0)]
In (11a), we just see how Wolter’s analysis accounts for simple deictic uses: 
a subsituation s4, such that there is only one couple in it is picked up by pointing, 
and the utterance is evaluated as usual. (11b) shows why lack of pointing makes 
the same sentence fail: now the relevant subsituation is indeterminate, since 
no specific subsituation of the speech situation is picked up by pointing; but 
other subsituations in the relevant speech situation would satisfy the uniqueness 
condition (they would be subsituations in which there is a unique couple), hence 
the utterance fails because its truth cannot be evaluated9. 
 Finally, (11c) shows why the additional modifier turns the utterance 
acceptable: the subsituation intended by the speaker to be identified by the 
hearer is, still, indeterminate; but now the additional modifier tells the hearer 
that, besides being distant from the speaker, the subsituation must be part of 
another situation (in the speech situation) in which the referent to be identified 
is next to a window. Well, there is now a subsituation in which the predicate 
“couple” satisfy uniqueness – hence, the sentence is interpretable and, moreover, 
felicitous in referring to the relevant couple.
 In short: we started by looking at the way additional descriptive content 
can license the NDNS use of DEMs: according to Wolter, following Dayal’s 
account of subtrigged any, it is because adjuncts may introduce “modally 
independent” situations. In order to implement this idea, we proposed that such 
“modally independent” situations allow an utterance to be interpreted even with 
an indeterminate subsituation of the speech situation. And we have, now, shown 
that these assumptions can explain – with no further ad hoc assumptions – cases 
in which additional descriptive content licenses deictic uses of DEMs with no 
demonstrations, like (1c). 
We take this combined explanation of both cases as a strong argument for 
Wolter’s theory of demonstrative indexing – and against theories which do not 
appeal to situation-based indexing, such as the direct reference theory. But the 
argument can be made stronger. 
9  An anonymous reviewer pointed out that we could think about the selection of subsituations 
in cases such as (1c)/(11c) as picking up the set of all compatibles subsituations, for example, in 
cases where there is more then one couple next to the window. So, we could have a set of all 
subsituations where there is a couple close to a window. Teixeira (2017) discusses similar case 
affirming that if the descriptive content is not enough to ensure unicity, the speaker adds more 
descriptive material until uniqueness will be satisfied. Hence, we can say that each one of these 
elements of restriction will reduce the domain until the uniqueness will be satisfied.   
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3. Additional descriptive content with no “modally independent 
situation”
Though the account presented in the previous section does seem to 
explain the role of additional descriptive content in some deictic uses of DEMs 
with no pointings, it cannot explain all cases. Indeed, the account relies on an 
analogy with NDNS uses, which happen to be licensed only by adjuncts – and 
only adjuncts can be “modally independent”. But here is a crucial difference 
between NDNS and deictic uses: the additional descriptive content contributed 
by an argument can actually license a deictic use without any pointing, as in 
the context in (12c) below (to be compared with the unavailability of a NDNS 
reading in (8c)):
(12) Context: in a scientific fair; two judges discuss the abilities  of the 
contestants, who they are watching; one of the judges whispers to the other, 
about the inventor of computer 1:
 a.  [pointing to him:]   
  That inventor is a genius.
 b.  [with no pointing:]  
  #That inventor is a genius.
 c.  [with no pointing:]
  That inventor of computers is a genius.
 
 Of course, if the contrast between adjuncts and arguments in licensing 
subtrigged any and NDNS uses of DEMS, as in (7) and (8), is correct, then the 
analysis we have given for (1c) – cf. (11c) above – cannot explain (12c): in (12c) 
the additional descriptive content of the DEM comes from an argument, and ar-
guments do not introduce “modally independent” situations according to Dayal 
(1998, 2004) and Wolter (2006). Therefore, (i) the adjunct-only restriction does 
computer 2
computer 1
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not hold to DEMs and (ii) cases like (12c) indicate that descriptive content can 
be sufficient by itself to license a deictic DEM – that is, independently of intro-
ducing an additional situation, and independently other “pragmatic means” such 
as demonstrations or contextual salience of the subsituation. 
 But how can that be? Under the theory we have been developing here, 
based on Wolter’s situation indexing, the answer is surprisingly simple: if the 
descriptive content of the DEM (i) can be compositionally computed; (ii) it is not 
restricted to adjuncts; and (iii) by itself it allows the identification of the proper 
speech subsituation in which unicity holds, then it does not need any further 
means, like demonstrations or other pragmatic information. To see this, let us 
take a look at the interpretations that the utterances in (12) would get in our 
analysis:
(13)  a. [[(12a)]] =  ιx [inventor (x, s3) & distant-from (x, speaker, s3)]. 
      genius (x, s0)
 b. [[(12b)]] = ιx [inventor (x, s?) & distant-from (x, speaker, s?)] . 
    genius (x, s0)
 c. [[(12c)]] = ιx [inventor-of-computers (x, s?) & distant-from (x, 
            speaker, s?)] . 
    genius (x, s0)
 We believe (13a) does not require any further comment at this point. 
Now consider the unsuccessful (12b), where absence of pointing leads to the 
impossibility of referent identification: according to (13b), absence of pointing 
actually corresponds to an indeterminate speech subsituation; since there are 
other speech subsituations in context (12) in which there would be an inventor 
“distant from” the speaker, there is no way of identifying the specific subsituation 
the speaker is trying to refer to. 
Finally, consider the crucial case (12c). Not only the additional descriptive 
content corresponding to the predicate argument does not introduce any 
“modally independent” situation, but the speech subsituation in which the DEM 
must refer is also indeterminate – since it was not identified by any pointing, nor 
by “contextual salience”. Even so, it is possible for the hearer to work out which 
speech subsituation is this, for there is only one computer which is “distant from” 
the speaker in speech situation, namely computer 1. That is, (12c) is clearly a 
case in which computing the descriptive content of a DEM compositionally is 
sufficient for the identification of a speech subsituation in which unicity holds – 
even in absence of a pointing.  That is, indexing may actually be indeterminate 
when compositional semantics can do the job, independently if the element 
responsible by restriction is an argument, an adjunct, or any other category. 
 Further cases confirm that DEMs are successful when there is an 
appropriate interaction between situation indexing and compositional 
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descriptive content. In (14) below we present a case that, for us, definitely shows 
that demonstrative indexing refers to speech subsituations:
(14)  Context: in a parking lot:
 a.  [pointing to a corner:]  
  # That car is mine.
 b.  [pointing to a corner:]     
  That red car is mine.
 c.  [no pointing:]
  # That red car is mine.
The crucial contrast is between (14a) and (14b). In (14a), pointing is 
picking up not a particular car, but a spatial area, in which there are three cars; 
that is, the subsituation is determinate, but still its identification is not enough for 
the DEM that car to pick up a unique car; hence, the utterance is unsuccessful. 
This case is adequately captured by the interpretation in (15a) below:10 
(15) a. [[(14a)]] = ιx [car (x, s3) & distant-from (speaker, s3)] .
    is-mine (x, s0)
 Of course, (15a) fails because the presupposition of unicity fails.
 In (14b), the case is similar to (14a) as far as indexing is concerned – the 
same spatial area is picked up by pointing; but now it is the additional descriptive 
content that allows proper identification of the car – even if indexing picks up 
a subsituation in which there are three cars; but only one is red! The felicity of 
(14b) is adequately captured by (15b) below. 
10   A reviewer suggests that it is “hard to tell whether the speaker is really pointing to an 
spatial area or not”; the speaker might be trying to point to a specific car, but pointing might 
be ambiguous, or the speaker might have just failed – and additional descriptive content might 
help “detecting the speaker’s intention”. These is an interesting suggestion; but it requires either 
clarifying what the ambiguity would be, or demonstrating the speaker intention’s failure – or 
the speaker’s intention, anyway. None of this is required in the analysis argued for in the text.
 The reviewer observes that “in some similar situations [...] the addition of a further 
qualification of the car (like red) is redundant” (it is possible to say “That red car” in a scene 
with just one car, though not with focus on red). He/she argues that “redundancy was one of 
the arguments used to defend [this paper’s] approach, but it does not seem that it is necessarily 
a problem”. We first note that the problem with redundancy raised in section 2 is conceptual, 
unrelated to the particular case in (14). Second, in the cases observed by the reviewer, both 
approaches – the one based on individual indexing and the one based on situation indexing 
– are empirically equivalent. And, third, it is precisely in cases like (14) – in which there is no 
redundancy – that the two approaches differ: for these, individual indexing will have to adopt 
something like the reviewer’s suggestion in the first paragraph of this note. 
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(15) b. [[(14b)]] = ιx [car (x, s3) & red (x, s3) & distant-from (speaker, s3)].
    is-mine (x, s0)
 Finally, (14c) confirms that, in (14), what is necessary is a proper interaction 
between indexing and descriptive content: in (14c) there is no indexing, hence 
the subsituation is indeterminate, as represented in (15c) below; since more than 
one speech subsituation in (14) is such that it would contain a unique red car 
“distant from” the speaker, the subsituation the speaker is referring to cannot be 
identified – and the utterance is infelicitous, despite the presence of additional 
descriptive content:
(15) c. [[(14c)]] = ιx [car (x, s?) & red (x, s?) & 
    distant-from (speaker, s?)] . is-mine (x, s0)
 
 As far as we can tell, (14) has never been discussed – and we cannot 
see how it can be accounted for if indexing does not pick up situations, but 
individuals.
 Just to end up this discussion, we note that demonstratives in general – 
whether DEMs or bare demonstrative determiners – are likely to be subject to 
the same basic principles governing the interaction between situation indexing 
and descriptive content – the principles we just presented. This is shown by 
(16) below, which reproduces the contrasts in (14), but now opposing bare 
demonstratives to simple DEMs; the interpretation of the utterances are given 
in (17): 
(16)  Context: A wallet, a book and a pen lie on a corner on a table. Someone 
 tries to refer to the wallet:
 a.  [No pointing:]            # That is mine.
 b.  [Pointing to the corner:]   # That is mine.
 c.  [Pointing to the corner:]      That wallet is mine.
(17) a. [[(16a)]] = ιx [in (x, s?) & distant-from (speaker, s?)] . is-mine (x, s0)
 b. [[(16b)]] = ιx [in (x, s7) & distant-from (speaker, s7)] . is-mine (x, s0)
 c. [[(16c)]] = ιx [wallet (x, s7) & distant-from (speaker, s7)] . is-mine 
             (x, s0)
(16) shows that it is “descriptive content”, and not additional descriptive 
content, which really matters – appropriate descriptive content will be necessary 
whenever indexing is not enough. (As for a situation in which indexing would 
be enough, imagine a context similar to (16) in which the wallet is in one corner 
of the table, and the book and the pen in the other.)
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4. Summing up
In this paper, we have discussed the role descriptive content has in the 
interpretation of demonstratives, starting with DEMs. In particular, we have discussed 
cases in which additional descriptive content seems to dispense with demonstrations 
and other pragmatic means of identifying the DEMs referent. As we tried to 
show, such cases are crucial for understanding the way the indexical component 
of demonstratives interacts with descriptive content. And, if our argumentation 
is correct, they actually constitute strong evidence for Wolter (2006)’s theory of 
demonstrative indexing where DEMs refer to subsituations, as opposed to theories 
that codify some version of Kaplan’s “direct reference” hypothesis in which DEMs 
refer directly to individuals. Summing up, we have shown that:
(i)  there is no need for ad hoc11 assumptions if we take Wolter (2006)’s 
 analysis seriously: the deictic component of DEMs indicate subsituations 
 of the default situation, and not individuals; hence, accounts of 
 demonstratives based on deixis to individuals are bound to be inadequate 
 – as is the case of Kaplan (1989), Nunberg (1993, 2004), King (2000) and 
 Elbourne (2008); 
(ii)  a crucial aspect to take into account, however, is that demonstrative deixis 
 is sometimes imprecise about the limits of the subsituation it tries to 
 indicate, in which case (additional) descriptive content may be required 
 to ensure unicity; 
(iii)  as a subsidiary result, we have shown that “attributive-like” uses of 
 DEMs (King’s NDNS uses) can have their readings properly understood 
 if the subsituation referred to by demonstrative is indeterminate: the 
 interaction of this with the rest of the sentence’s generic-like semantics 
 provide a natural characterization of NDNS readings. 
11  It is important recall that ‘s?’ is not a new kind of situation, since it is part of the set of 
subsituations proposed by Wolter (2006). 
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